

Share buy-backs

OK, let's get started on preparing to brief the Committee on those extra items in the Review's terms of reference.

Let's start with share buy-backs, where companies decide to buy-back shares from their own shareholders.

This is a tax-driven rort!

Those participating in the buy-back benefit at the expense of those who do not.

We would first have to be clear what those participating get.

It is regular commercial practice for companies to buy back their own shares - say, to re-jig their debt to equity structure by borrowing to purchase the shares.

We have to make sure the tax treatment of share buy-backs neither encourages nor gets in the way of such commercial decisions.

And, picking up on Sami's point, companies treat their participating shareholders differently depending on whether the buy-back is conducted "on market" or "off market".

!?!

Oh, sounds interesting already.

With an on-market buy-back, the company is buying back its own shares just like any other purchaser in the market for the company's shares.

The sellers of those shares don't know whether they are selling back to the company or to another shareholder.

!?!

OK. They just get the market price for their shares

In contrast, with an off-market buy-back, shareholders specifically opt to sell back to the company.

But, under both both types of buy-back, the shares bought back by the company are cancelled, along with associated contributed capital and retained income or profits.

So, in both cases, a complete "slice" of the company is bought back.



Which suggests remaining shareholders maintain their proportionate interests in contributed capital and retained profits.

The company doing the buy-back could fund the share purchases by borrowing.



Then, the company would achieve a reduction in contributed capital and increase in debt funding to back its existing assets.

The company could, instead, sell assets to pay for the "slice" of company bought back.

In fact, at the extreme, selling all assets to pay out all shareholders and cancel their shares is the same as liquidating the company.



So, equating share buy-backs with partial liquidations immediately underlines the need for consistency in tax treatment between share buy-backs and company liquidations - as well as share sales after a dividend payout.

In particular, sound tax design for these three situations - set against our full imputation and CGT arrangements - sees a single layer of tax at shareholders' tax rates apply to the income received by shareholders.



I know there has to be tax rorting amongst all of this.



I find this all very exciting, Claudia, but.....




I thought the measure of sound design when taxing investment income was to have annual pre-tax return cut after tax by the investor's tax rate.

Not pre- versus post-tax return again!

That crucial measure for ideal design remains, Sami, including with share buy-backs.

But seeking at least a single layer of tax is a necessary fallback for buy-backs when we have imputation company tax treatment rather than integration - and, as Brad would fully appreciate, CGT generally applied on a realisations basis.



Now, to set the scene for analysing share buy-backs, imagine a company in which Kate contributed \$100 of capital at the start-up of the company.

The company pays tax at 30%, and Kate at 39%.

I love to see numbers used for analysis.

Over time, the company earns \$100 of income for each \$100 of contributed capital. All of the income is taxable, so the company has paid \$30 tax under our full imputation system.

The company, being a growth company, has retained all of its post-tax income along with the \$30 of imputation credits associated with each \$100 of pre-tax profit.

The company only has local shareholders, all of whom value the retained credits \$ for \$ given the refunds available for any excess credits in their tax assessments.

Kate's shareholding is consequently valued at \$200.

Lots of assumptions, Claudia!

No growth premium in the share price I see.

Off-market share buy-back

Now, let's start with an off-market buy-back.

And, I'm first going to assume our realisations CGT no longer provides a 50% discount for gains on share sales.

Another assumption, Claudia.

To help bring out key issues, Brad.

Kate's company announces that it plans to undertake the buy-back and Kate is ready to sell her shares in the buy-back or prior to it.

Then there is Jim, who hears about the buy-back and wants to buy shares before the buy-back so he can participate and get what he sees as associated tax benefits.

I'm with Jim on that!


So, prior to the buy-back with the share price still at \$200, Kate sells her shares and Jim, who is on a 47% tax rate, buys \$200 worth of shares.

At this point, double tax has been paid on the \$100 of company income: \$30 by the company; and CGT of \$39 by Kate.

What!! I knew CGT was a problem.

There wouldn't be double tax under integration.

On the contrary, Brad. See what happens when Jim sells out in the buy-back.



First note that to entice shareholders to participate in the buy-back the company might only have to pay \$170 for a parcel of shares valued at \$200.

Foreign shareholders won't value the parcel at \$200.



You're right, Brad, unless the non-resident shareholders get a full credit for the \$30 of imputation credits in their home country.


So the greater the dominance of non-resident shareholders in the company the more the value of the shares would likely be pushed below \$200.

Of course, such non-resident shareholders would like to divert the franking credits to locals and so share in the benefits of the credits.

That's when our franking credit trading rules come into play.

Right.

Under integration, holding period determines shareholders' share of credits and retained taxed income, which becomes their capital.



OK, OK. I'll explain all that to the Committee but this is how I will first explain the mechanics of off-market buy-backs under current imputation arrangements and assuming local shareholders.

So, we have Kate selling out and Jim buying for \$200 before the buy-back and then Jim receiving \$170 cash in the buy-back.

(a) Kate sells to Jim for 200
39 CGT

(b) Off-market buy-back



less 47 from CGT loss

(b) Jim paid 170 in buy-back



For the slice of the company bought back from Jim for \$170, Jim receives \$100 of contributed capital and \$70 of the company's post-tax income.

He also receives \$30 of tax savings courtesy of imputation credits.

But Jim's tax rate is 47%.



(a) Kate
sells to
Jim for 200
39 CGT

(b) Off-
market
buy-back



Jim pays 17 extra tax
less 47 from CGT loss
(b) Jim paid 170 in buy-back



Yes, Brad, Jim's tax rate is 47% - so he pays an extra \$17 beyond the \$30 paid by the company on its \$100 of taxable income.

Jim's tax assessment includes taxable income of \$100 (\$70 franked dividends plus \$30 credits) plus tax credit of \$30.

So Jim only gets \$153!



Most importantly, Brad, Jim also gets a \$100 capital loss, which is worth \$47 to him as he is able to apply the loss to capital gains he has.

What! A capital loss. I knew there was tax rorting here.

Yes. Jim paid \$200 for his shares and only got \$100 of capital back.



So, Jim faces \$17 extra tax on \$100 of company income but gets \$47 tax savings from a matching \$100 loss.

In net terms, he gets \$30 savings, equal to the tax credits. That is why he was prepared to pay \$200 for his shares.

And, overall, after the buy-back, there has been \$39 paid on the \$100 of company income: that is one layer of tax at Kate's 39% tax rate.



Net tax on 100 income:
Company 30
Kate(39%) 39
Jim (47%) 17 } 30 + 170
-47 } = 200

39
One layer at Kate's tax rate over time



See - it is the same amount of tax that Kate would have paid had she received the \$70 of franked dividends herself in the buy-back.

And Jim's tax assessment of the buy-back, summarised as, \$100 taxable income offset by \$100 capital loss and net \$30 tax savings from imputation credits, is independent of his tax rate.

What!! Super funds on 15% will benefit more. And that capital loss is definitely a tax rort. And all shareholders should also get franked dividends. And I question the 30% discount on the buy-back price.



Neat, Claudia!



The capital loss just mirrors, in reverse, the capital gain previously realised by Kate when she sold her shares.

CGT applying to share sales is more about maintaining share prices than about raising tax revenue. Imagine the pricing effects if Kate were not subject to CGT at all on her share sales and Jim got no capital loss.

The capital loss looks contrived.

Yes, yes, Sami we will explain to the Committee.

Under integration, Kate would have been taxed on the \$100 of retained company income when it was earned and there would be no double tax on her sale to Jim. Share price and buy-back price would be \$170.

Under imputation, Brad, Jim would have realised that same \$100 capital loss had the company, instead of doing the buy-back, distributed all its retained post-tax income and then Jim sold out for \$100.

Or, alternatively, the company sold all its assets and liquidated, distributing all retained income and capital to shareholders.

As discussed, an off-market buy-back, with its cancellation of shares in the bought back slice of the company, can be viewed as a part liquidation.

And, it is important to have consistent tax treatment across these equivalent financial situations that can remove prior double taxation of company profits.

And, Brad, a super fund on a 15% tax rate would get the same net \$30 tax savings as Jim.

The fund would get a refund of \$15 of the \$30 paid by the company plus \$15 worth of capital loss.

Remember no CGT discount is assumed.

Oh, yeah, half CGT has to be better.

Well, with half CGT, the buy-back could again offset prior double tax.

But, it suffers from the same fairness and pricing problems as would no CGT.

These two purists again!!

**Net tax on 100 income
(50% CGT discount):**
Company 30
Kate(39%) 19.5
Jim (47%) 17 } $6.5 + 170$
 -23.5 } = 176.5

 43

**More than one layer at
Kate's tax rate over time**

Look. I have just done some numbers
on the impact of half CGT.

With half CGT applying, let's first keep
Jim on a 47% tax rate.

Then, while Kate benefits from half CGT,
the value to Jim of his \$100 capital loss is
only \$23.5 instead of \$47.

More than than one layer of tax at Kate's tax
rate is paid overall because Jim only nets
\$176.5 from the buy-back instead of \$200.

Nice, Sami. Lots
of share price
effects, too.

**Net tax on 100 income
(50% CGT discount):**
Company 30
Kate(39%) 19.5
Jim (15%) -15 } $22.5 + 170$
 -7.5 } = 192.5

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**Less than one layer at
Kate's tax rate over time**

And, see what happens if Jim is on a
15% tax rate.

Kate still benefits from half CGT.

But, Jim nets \$192.5, much closer to
the \$200 cost of his shares than
when he is on a 47% tax rate

On a 0% tax rate, say in super
pension mode, Jim would net
the full \$200 from \$30 of credits.

Nice
one,
Sami.

So? We all know
franking credits are
better for those on
lower tax rates.

That's just not right, Brad.

The problem is that the half capital loss disadvantages higher tax rate
participating shareholders more relative to those on lower tax rates.

More generally, it is just not fair that
people can sell their shares and
attract half CGT while people
participating in an off-market buy-
back are denied the full capital loss
that is required for balanced decision-
making across all different tax rates.

Well
said!

Wait
there!

Talking about fairness, Jim and others participating in the buy-back are getting franked dividends while other shareholders - likely the vast majority of shareholders - are not!

The dividends paid to Jim in the tax-driven buy-back belong equitably to all shareholders whose proportionate interests in those dividends are consequently trampled on.

All shareholders are morally and legally entitled to share in these buy-back dividends.



Brad, we have seen that a buy-back does not just involve a dividend distribution.

It is a part liquidation with profits plus associated capital being bought and cancelled.

If the same profits and capital were distributed to all shareholders, that would liquidate the company.

It is, nevertheless, important that the slice of company being bought back does represent a proportionate share of contributed capital, untaxed profits and taxed profits with associated franking credits.

Those not participating in the buy-back would then retain their interests in undistributed profits and credits.

But, on pricing of off-market buy-backs, I have seen stats showing the discount to market price is often less than associated fully-valued franking credits.

In your example, more than \$170 is paid.

Meaning remaining shareholders are worse off because too much is paid to those selling out.

Usually shareholders get the chance to offer to sell in the buy-back at a specific discount to market price, which will reflect their view of companies' future prospects.

But, lack of available capital gains to offset capital losses and, as we have seen, only half loss allowed can only push up shareholders' offer price.

On that note, let's now turn to on-market buy-backs.

On-market share buy-back

Again our company decides to re-jig its capital structure by borrowing to buy back a specific number of its own shares.

This time, however, the company announces that it is simply going to buy the shares back like any other share purchaser - perhaps because of simplicity, despite there being no prospect of buying back at a discount to market price.

And again we have Kate selling shares and Jim buying shares prior to the buy-back so he can participate.



(a) Kate sells to Jim for 200
39 CGT


(b) On-market buy-back



(b) Jim paid 200 in buy-back

Includes 30 for tax credits

Remaining holders get credits later



Again, the shares bought back by the company are cancelled, along with associated contributed capital and retained profits

But, unlike the off-market variety, the company retains the franking credits associated with the profits bought back.

Those credits will be distributed later to 'remaining' shareholders along with untaxed profits.

Thus, the double tax that occurs when Kate sells her shares is not offset until those credits are distributed - at the extreme, when the company liquidates (perhaps increasing franked dividends, reducing capital returns and producing a capital loss).

All very theoretical, Claudia.

Please let me show the tax numbers.

Net tax on 100 income:

Company	30
Kate(39%)	39
Jim (47%)	0
Remaining	-30

39

**One layer at Kate's
tax rate over time**

With Jim on a 47% tax rate and no CGT discount, as with the off-market buy-back, there is one layer of tax paid over time at Kate's 39% tax rate.

The differences this time are that Jim pays no extra tax and \$30 of tax savings has to await the company's distribution of franking credits to shareholders.

The example is artificial and meaningless

Jim pays no tax because he simply buys and then sells at \$200.

Brad, the examples are purposely simple to highlight tax design insights for share buy-backs.

But change the examples' details and the tax design message will be the same.

And that message is that current design is sound, so long as the components of the slice of company being bought back are correctly measured.

Claudia, your examples nicely highlight imputation and CGT interaction.

But with much improvement possible from removing the CGT discount.

Moreover, if imputation were upgraded to integration of taxable income, your illustrations of off- and on-market buy-backs would neatly coalesce.

!!

Under integration, there should be no retained franking credits in your illustrations and no double tax when Kate sells her shares. Buy-back price would be \$170 in both cases with no remnant franking credits in the on-market case.

One layer of tax at shareholders' rates would apply to companies's taxable income each year, not just 'over time'. And, if we added accruals CGT to the design

Hold on Sami, we'll just be seeking in-principle endorsement of accruals CGT from the Committee.

Let's take a break before reviewing tax consolidation of company groups tomorrow.

You never give up, Sami!